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DISTINCTIVELY CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES
ON LEGALTHOUGHT?
Mark Tushnet*
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT. Edited by

Michael

W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., and Angela C. Carmella. New
Haven: Yale University Press. 2001. Pp. xxii, 518. Cloth, $50; paper,
$26.95.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The plural in the title of Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought
immediately suggests one problem in reviewing this collection of
essays: identifying unifying themes is difficult precisely because there
are a variety of Christian perspectives represented here.1 Christian
perspectives include those of Anabaptists and their modern successors
such as Mennonites (who regard law as simply irrelevant to their
Christianity2), those of the nineteenth-century Catholic church (which
was hostile to democracy and religious toleration), and those of the
modern Catholic church (which endorses religious pluralism and the
preferential option for the poor - among many others).3 What, then,

* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. J.D. 1971, M.A. (History) 1971, Yale. - Ed.
·

1. Indeed, the editors devote Part Two of the book to "Christian Traditions and the
Law," drawing on H. Richard Niebuhr's distinctions among synthesists who seek to reconcile
Christ and the (existing) law, conversionists who seek to transform the law through Christ,
separatists who believe that Christ necessarily stands against the positive law of any state,
and dualists who see Christ and the law in creative tension. Leslie Griffin quotes Niebuhr to
this effect: "[I]t must be evident that neither extension nor refinement of study could bring
us to the conclusive result that would enable us to say, 'This is the Christian answer.' " P.
199; see also p. 178 (essay by Teresa Stanton Collett) ("In considering the relation between
orthodox Christianity and feminism, one is struck by the diversity of thought and emphasis
within each of these 'communities of faith.' " (emphasis added)).
2. Editor Robert F. Cochran, Jr., pithily summarizes the position of the late Mennonite
theologian John Howard Yoder: "[I]t is not the business of Christians to work out the ethical
problems of Satan." P. 246.
3. The editors acknowledge this problem by, for example, pairing essays offering dif
fering Christian perspectives on law-and-economics. Stephen M. Bainbridge offers an "apo
logia" to the effect that law-and-economics refrains from paying much attention to questions
of distributive justice on the ground that achieving economic justice through deliberate legal
intervention raises difficult technical and prudential questions and is less likely to achieve
such justice than the operation of market mechanisms that maximize wealth, pp. 208-23,
while George E. Garvey draws on Catholic social thought to.argue that "maximizing the ag
gregate wealth of society is not a morally acceptable goal if it results in a grossly inequitable
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might be distinctive about Christian 'perspectives, given their diver
sity?4 We can approach this question in stages.5 First, what - if any
thing - distinguishes religious perspectives on legal thought from
secular ones? Second, within the class of religious perspectives, what
distinguishes Christian perspectives from other religious perspectives?
I consider here some of the answers suggested by some of the
essays in this collection.6 First, several authors treat the perspective
they derive from Christian belief as producing results that non
Christians and even nonbelievers should accept. Second, other authors
treat their perspective on legal thought as Christian because they are
Christians and feel (in a psychological sense, I think) that their per
spectives arise organically from their Christian belief, but they do not
explain the nature of that connection or why an outsider should think
that there is any nonpsychological connection. Third, a handful of the
argue isn't precisely the right word, but per
authors do something
haps show is - to make the connection between their Christian belief
and their perspective on law apparent.7
My discussion is framed by something that puzzled me when I read
-

the Introduction, a puzzlement that persisted pretty much throughout
my reading the book.8 The editors write, "The key question of this

distribution of that wealth," p. 239, and that economic growth is good "if it is achieved in
ways that respect human dignity and when the benefits are distributed in ways that are just."
P. 240; cf RAYMOND PLANT, POLITICS, THEOLOGY AND HISTORY 118 (2001) ("From a uni
versalising systematic theology we might be able to ground a general Christian concern for
social justice, but such a general grounding may completely underdetermine Christian politi
cal praxis.").
4. The diversity within the Christian tradition suggests that some of Stephen L. Carter's
formulations are, at best, incautious. See, e. g., p. 30 (referring to the "distorted Christianity
of the Middle Ages" as "barely recognizable as Christian"); p. 34 (asserting that "some
Western religions have caved in to the pressure to organize according to the meanings pro
pounded by the state," following an acknowledgment that religious traditions change their
understandings of their own content (emphasis added)).

5. A similar question arises in connection with Paul Beaumont, Christian Perspectives on
LAW AND RELIGION 529 (Richard O'Dair &
Andrew Lewis eds., 2001). Despite its title, Beaumont's essay discusses the way in which
Christians might distin<;tively argue for positions that non-Christians adopt for other reasons.

the Law: What Makes them Distinctive?, in

6. I do not discuss those essays that are primarily expositions of the views of Christian
thinkers (other than the essays' authors) about law, primarily because I am in no position to
say anything interesting about the views of, for example, the Dutch Calvinist Herman
Dooyeweerd, as presented by David S. Caudill. Pp. 119-26. Nor do I discuss the extraordi
nary meditation by Thomas L. Shaffer on forgiveness, pp. 321-39, which invites a conversa
tional dialogue rather than the desiccated written response or reaction of a book review.
7. In distinguishing between arguing and showing, I have in mind something like Witt
genstein's point that some words cannot be defined but their meaning can be shown.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 'll 70-75 (G. E. M. Anscombe
trans., 2d ed. rept. 1998) (1958).
8. One source of the puzzlement may be that the collection's essays are, so to speak,
theologically thin. The essays written from within the Roman Catholic tradition advert to
and rely on the Church's teachings as expressed in papal encyclicals and other church docu
ments, but do little in the way of explaining the place such writings have in Roman Catholic
theology. And, there is almost no reference to or reliance on the important development of
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book may be, 'What does it mean in America today to say that Jesus,
rather than Caesar, is Lord?' " (p. xx). It seems to me that that ques
tion, suitably adapted, will be a key one to an adherent of any religion
that either makes no claims against whoever happens to hold secular
power - a large class, I think - or to adherents of religions that as
sert their right to rule in a perfect world but acknowledge that they
live in an imperfect one, governed by Caesar. 9 That is, the question
that the editors think is the key one does not seem to me to raise ques
tions that are distinctively Christian. I would have thought that, rather
than "Jesus is Lord" (1 Corinthians 12:3), the proof-texts around
which the essays would center would be "God so loved the world that
he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should
not perish, but have everlasting life." (John 3:16). I would have
thought, that is, that a distinctively Christian perspective would derive
from the combination of a belief in a fallen world, which some authors
mention but which is shared by Jews among others, coupled with a
belief in the possibility of redemption, which is also shared by Jews
among others, as confirmed by Jesus's death and resurrection, which is
what distinguishes Christianity from other religions that otherwise
agree on fallen-ness and the possibility of redemption.10 Yet, while
fallen-ness and the possibility of redemption crop up in several essays,
few seem to make Jesus's death and resurrection central to their
authors' perspectives on legal thought. I conclude this Review with a
brief speculation about why that might have occurred after discussing
the three categories of essays I have described.
II.

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES COMPATIBLE WITH SECULAR
PERSPECTIVES

The United States is a religiously pluralist culture dominated by
Christianity. Given pluralism, it is understandable that some authors
- and to some extent the editors - assimilate Christian perspectives

narrative theology in modern Protestantism. Stanley Hauerwas is mentioned occasionally,
but his theological method is not, except in Shaffer's essay. P. 329.
9. David M. Smolin suggests a distinctively Christian approach to the question, though,
in his observation that Christians are instructed to turn the other cheek and not to return evil
for evil. P. 371.
10. Bill Stuntz pointed out to me that the essays also do not discuss in detail Jesus's posi
tion, historically important in the emergence of Christianity from Judaism and more gener
ally important in the development of Christian perspectives on law, which was that the Mo
saic law failed in producing good behavior because mere compliance with the law alone
could not produce good people. E-mail from Bill Stuntz, Professor, Harvard Law School, to
Mark Tushnet (Feb. 4, 2003) (on file with author). Obviously, a critique of the Mosaic law
need not generalize into a critique of law as such, yet Jesus's critique of the Mosaic law was
often generalized in that manner.
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to religious ones more generally.11 So, for example, the editors assert
that "Christianity, along with other faiths, may be an antidote to th[ e]
great moral failing of our time," the domination of modern life by
"selfish, shallow, materialistic, cruel, and nihilistic values."12 And, in
deed, some of the Christian perspectives presented here are compati
ble with wholly secular ones.
For example, Marci A. Hamilton attributes the Framers' design of
the Constitution, and particularly their reliance on structural rather
than substantive guarantees for liberty, to a Calvinist and Presbyterian
tradition that coupled distrust of fallen human beings with optimism
about the ability of structures to deter tyranny (p. 293). This "funda
mental distrust of human motives, beliefs, and actions . . . counsels in
favor of diligent surveillance of one's own and other's [sic] actions,"
and in favor as well of the "value of the law . . . to guide human
behavior away from its propensity to do wrong" (p. 295). Hamilton
connects this view to the educational backgrounds of important Fram
ers such as James Madison and James Wilson (p. 294), and then ex
plores the ways in which the view played itself out in the Constitu
tional Convention (pp. 296-304).
All this is fair enough, and historically illuminating. But, aside
from the biographical points about the Framers, nothing in the per
spective
a form of skepticism joined with a form of optimism - is
-

distinctively Christian. Even secularists could hold similar views. A
prime candidate for a secular view combining skepticism on the level
of individuals with optimism on the social level is the view that sees
people motivated by rational self-interest as understood by econo
mists. Stephen M. Bainbridge's essay suggests the point. Bainbridge
asks whether law-and-economics is a perspective a Christian can
hold.13 Bainbridge seeks to allay concern that the assumptions about
human behavior animating law-and-economics are inconsistent with
Christian views. Bainbridge brings Christian and secular perspectives
into alignment by arguing that a Christian can believe that economic
policy should be motivated solely by the goal of wealth maximization
even though Christianity incorporates "other normative values" be
cause those values are better expressed elsewhere and badly expressed
in economic policy (pp. 212-13). He further argues that Christians can
use rational-choice assumptions to analyze public policy even though
rational-choice models seem to preclude appeal to "the Christian vir-

11. See, e.g., p. 469 (essay on legal ethics by Joseph G. Allegretti) (asking, "What does
God require of me, or you, or any Christian? Simply this: to do justice, love mercy, and walk
humbly with our God." (citing Micah 6:8)).
12. P. xix ("To ignore Christian (and other religious) perspectives on law is like ignoring
a life raft on an endangered vessel.").
13. Bainbridge explicitly refers to "the Calvinist principle of sphere sovereignty" in de
fending the limited state. Pp. 214-15.
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tues" and seem to be inconsistent with the communitarian elements in
Christian thought because such models do not hold themselves out as
providing moral norms.14
Catherine M.A. Mc Cauliff's essay on contract law is perhaps even
more dramatic in its insistence that general - and, to my mind, secu
lar - principles are equally Christian principles. The essay focuses on
Lord Mansfield and Lord Denning, who, according to Mc Cauliff,
"applied timeless Christian values to particular legal problems," and,
in Denning's case, "used explicitly Christian language" (p. 471). She
describes two of Denning's opinions dealing with the law of construc
tive trusts. These opinions, she argues, were motivated by Denning's
Christian beliefs and "reflect[] a Christian interpretation of natural
law and the equity of the law."1 5 She continues, "The fair person out
side the natural-law tradition - indeed, outside the Christian tradition
entirely - frequently reaches the same result as the Christian . . . but
would not go beyond fairness to faith in explaining the morality of the
decisions" (p. 481).
As Mc Cauliff points out, there is one Christian tradition according
to which secular and religious perspectives on moral problems should
converge. This is the natural-law tradition, which, as Angela C.
Carmella puts it, "enabled the [Roman Catholic] church to converse
with people of all faiths and of no faith, because the reasoned
discourse offered by natural law was considered universal to all per
sons."16 Using Augustine as a model, H. Jefferson Powell develops a
criticism of modern liberal polities that leads him to conclude:

[T] he Christian's loyalty to society and state is strictly limited and critical:
all claims that cultural achievements or earthly politics are the modality
of ultimate human fulfillment are excluded, and secular institutions must
limit themselves to the penultimate resolution of issues involving "the
things relevant to mortal life." But within those limits, and with respect
to those goals, Christians share their pagan fellow citizens' obligation to
seek the common good . ...(p.82; emphasis added)
The first part of this formulation invokes a religious - though not, I
think, a distinctively Christian - view, while the second part aligns the
believer with the nonbeliever. Of course, John Rawls provided a

14. P. 217; see, e.g., p. 222 (asserting that the assumptions about human behavior made
by law-and-economics "are largely congruent with the fallen state of man").
15. P. 481. Contrary to Mc Caulifrs claim, though, I do not find in the opinions any ex
plicitly Christian language, unless she means that the explicit invocation of fairness is explic
itly Christian. The signal "see" doesn't quite do the job, but in any event, see Eves v. Eves, 1
W.L.R. 1338 (C.A. 1975), and Tanner v. Tanner, 1 W.L.R. 1346 (C.A. 1975). For a similar
suggestion that Christianity is distinctively concerned with justice, see p. xi (preface by Har
old J. Berman) (giving an example that moves from a discussion of Christianity to a discus
sion of justice without indicating that the author believes that a transition has occurred).
16. P. 273. Gerard V. Bradley provides an expository essay on the natural-law tradition
with particular emphasis on modern natural-law theory. Pp. 277-90.
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secular version of the view that all people exercising their capacity to
reason will converge on a set of principles to guide public policy.17
Non-Christians and secularists may be comforted by learning that
this sort of convergence is possible, because it allows for alliances and
"peace treaties" in the conduct of public life.1 8 And, I believe, the
editors are right in suggesting that the culture of modern America
makes it important to educate (some) non-Christians and secularists in
this way. They note that "[i]n recent years the most vocal proponents
of Christian perspectives on law and politics have come from the
religious right," leading "many in the American academy" to fear
"that a Christian view of law will yield an authoritarian conservative
regime" (p. xxi). The editors "offer two responses," one of which is
that "this is an inaccurate caricature," referring to the range of posi
tions - from conservative to progressive (on slavery's abolition, on
the death penalty, on social justice, for example) - taken by evangeli
cal Christians and the Roman Catholic church throughout U.S. his
tory.19 Yet, the very point of demonstrating the possibility of conver
gence is to show that there is nothing distinctively Christian about the
matters as to which convergence occurs.20
Ill. CHRISTIANITY GENERATING PERSPECTIVES ON LAW
Another set of essays is related to the first. In the second group the
author says, in effect: "I am a Christian, and here is my perspective on

17. Michael McConnell refers to this aspect of Rawls's work with an unexplained am
bivalence. See pp. 17-18 ("To borrow a distinction from John Rawls without necessarily em
bracing his conception of it, early liberalism was a 'political' liberalism.").
18. Which was one of Rawls's basic points.
19. P. xxi. Their second response is "that it is unprincipled and undemocratic to exclude
or marginalize fellow citizens on the mere expectation that they will vote the wrong way." Id.
(emphasis added). This raises larger questions than the single sentence devoted to it by the
editors can address, although some are touched on as well in Michael McConnell's essay, pp.
5-24, which succinctly restates his position on the relation between Christianity and liberal
ism, taking the latter as both a concept in political theory and a practice embedded in his
torical time.
20. Raymond Plant suggests that the difficulty I identify in this section may be a version
of a more general difficulty in developing what he calls a political theology:
If the universal is stressed, then we are likely to end up with a form of political theology
which is, as it were, deduced from some basic doctrine of God, creation and the human per
son which, in turn, is held to underpin rather generalised assertions about the nature of po
litical values such as freedom, social justice, the common good and rights. These might be
too vague and indeterminate

to link into anything like the ways of life of particular societies,

and will not provide rich enough moral ground for Christian political commitments. On the
other hand, if the emphasis is placed upon particular communities and their ways of life, it
will not be at all clear how these more fragmentary judgements about particular societies will
relate to more general beliefs about the nature of God and, in particular, the coherence of
God's will in terms of values and the implications of.such beliefs for a more general theistic
account of the nature of human politics, economics and community life.

PLANT, supra note 3, at 19.
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law, which - as I experience it - arises from my Christian belief."
Often the perspective is, once again, not distinctively Christian.
John Witte, Jr., and John Copeland Nagle provide two good
examples. Early in his essay on the history of marriage law and its
relation to Christianity, Witte observes that "convictions" drawn from
religion "inform my work on the interaction of law and religion in
Western history" (p. 409). These convictions, he writes, include "the
assumption that God is both hidden and revealed in human laws and
that human laws in turn both reflect and deflect divine values" (p.
409). On reading Witte's account of the interaction between marriage
law and theological norms, I wondered whether a historian with dif
ferent religious beliefs, or with none at all, would treat the material
differently. It seems to me that Christianity figures in Witte's work as
a motivation for his identification of topics, and perhaps as a source of
insight into the material that would be more difficult for a non
Christian to gain.21
Nagle asserts that he seeks a "distinctively Christian message about
environmental law" (p. 438). He lists his assumptions, such as these:
God created the world, God's creation is good, God is the owner of all
creation, God gave humans dominion over creation (pp. 438-42). He
continues that his essay is an "attempt . . . to explain how one Chris
tian - namely, me - tries to take the Christian teaching on creation
and a Christian understanding of law and apply them to several cur
rent problems in environmental law" (p. 442). Nagle then identifies
problems such as conflicts between people and creatures, such as
mountain lions encroaching on suburbs (or suburbs encroaching on
mountain lions), and the threat to endangered species. Nagle refers to
the diversity of God's creation and the story of Noah's Ark as provid
ing the basis for a "Christian duty to preserve endangered species."22
He concludes that the best policy approach to the conflicts he identi
fies is a balancing approach, which is of course not distinctively
Christian but which, Nagle says, "fits well with Christian teachings" (p.

451).
Of course I accept these authors' assertions of the connections be
tween their Christian beliefs and their perspectives on the topics they
write about, but I find in the essays little to suggest the nature of those
connections. Timothy L. Hall's essay on the Baptist tradition comes
much closer to showing how such connections arise, and discussing it
can serve as a transition to my consideration of a third set of essays.

21. Witte's Christianity, that is, seems to me to serve as a guide to what philosophers of
science call hypothesis selection or generation rather than as a guide to the identification of
truth.
22. P. 444. I would note that the reference to Noah's Ark suggests that the duty to pre
serve species is not distinctively Christian. (I believe that there are parallel stories in other
religious traditions as well.)
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Most of Hall's essay is an exposition of the traditional Baptist posi
tion of strict separation, but Hall concludes with a few pages criticizing
the interest of some modern Baptists in "us[ing] the law to impose
moral and social norms consistent with their understanding of
Christian teachings" (p. 349). Hall sympathetically locates the reason
for this interest in the moral pluralism that "has challenged . . . confi
dence that democratic systems can find common cause around a set of
fundamental moral principles," but finds the interest inconsistent with
deeper Baptist traditions and "harmful to the cause of Christ."2 3 The
newer practice is harmful to that cause because it limits the ability
of Baptists to make common cause with other Christians and with
non-Christians, but perhaps more because "[t]he gospel of peace be
comes associated with the sword," and there's one with an ensuing
"stunted vision of Christian principles" such as nonretribution and
sacrificial love (pp. 351-52). As Hall writes,

The surge of enthusiasm for "Christian" values ... entices followers of
Christ to label as Christian values that are scarcely more than law
abidingness. There is nothing uniquely Christian, for example, in re
fraining from harming others - especially the innocent - or in being
faithful to one's commitments, including one's marriage commit
ments....The call of Christ is to something more than good citizenship,
something more than stolid Republican conservativism. But the constant
trumpeting of calls for "Christian values" seems to suggest otherwise. (p.
352)
Hall concludes, "The law does not need to be tethered to Christ, and
the cause of Christ neither needs to be nor profits from being tethered
to the law" (p. 352).
Hall's approach emerges organically from his Christian commit
ments and its insistence on identifying something that makes a per
spective distinctively Christian. Perhaps Hall can do this because of the
content of his position.24 He argues that Baptist pietism can make
"[v]ery little" contribution to law, because that "theological perspec
tive denies to law the mantle of either inherent divinity or diabolical
ness" (p. 352). The other essays in this collection rarely if ever claim
that law is inherently divine or diabolical. Yet, the more restrained the
claims are, the more, that is, they recognize that the work of fallen
human beings partakes of both divinity and fallen-ness, the less dis
tinctively Christian the claims are.

23. P. 350. Hall's invocation of what I call deeper traditions is of course something that
someone operating within a tradition can do. But, outsiders note, as do the editors, the varia
tion over time in the content of something that is nonetheless identifiably a single tradition.
24. Although in quoting these passages from Hall, I acknowledge that I am - and am
intending to - endorse the separatist tradition Hall associates with traditional Baptism.
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IV. CHRISTIAN BELIEF 0RGANICALLY CONNECTED TO A
PERSPECTIVE ON LAW

Stephen L. Carter and Teresa Stanton Collett both offer critiques
of liberalism. Carter's summarizes the views he has presented in more
detail elsewhere. 25 Carter's critique of liberalism is more from a gen
erically religious point of view than from a distinctively Christian one.
Collett's is different. The content is not all that different from Carter's,
but the presentation - the pervasive Christianity - is. She begins
with one of the book's few mentions of what I would have thought
truly distinctive about Christian beliefs. Acknowledging diversity
among Christians, Collett nonetheless points to the unity among
Christians on the beliefs "that God created the universe in accordance
with a divine plan, that people are estranged from God, and that
God's plan included the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ as
the means of reconciling Creator and created" (p. 178). Collett's cri
tique of liberalism takes the form of an exegesis of biblical texts from
the Christian gospels as mediated through recent papal encyclicals.
Angela C. Carmella's presentation of the Catholic Church's social
teachings is equally distinctively Christian even though the content of
the social teachings itself is not. Like Collette, Carmella invokes Je
sus's death and resurrection as central to her perspective on law: "Be
cause the Word has become flesh, things of the earth can carry the
mystery and power of God" (p. 257). From this, she argues, the
Catholic Church has a "clear theological sense of immersion in the
world and of movement toward its transformation through the promo
tion of human dignity" (p. 258). She emphasizes as well the recent ex
pansion of the Church's discourse beyond the natural-law tradition to
include thick doses of biblical language: "Both the Bible and the
church's sacramental sense call on Christians to see Jesus in the de
spised, the poor, the weak, and the 'useless' " (p. 275).
Richard F. Duncan's essay demonstrates the same kind of organic
connection between the author's Christianity and his perspective on
law, albeit the content of the perspective is quite different. Duncan's
central contention is that "Christians wander today in an America that
has rejected our God - indeed, in an America that often seems to be
waging war against our God" (p. 355). But, in ways resembling tradi
tional pietists, Duncan recognizes that the law of Babylon "will typi
cally reflect the morality and values of Babylon, not those of Jerusa
lem" (pp. 355-56). Duncan therefore suggests that Christians can do
little more than adopt pragmatic responses to the law's threats, the

25. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN
LAW ANO POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); STEPHEN L. CARTER,
Goo's NAME IN vAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS (2000).

May

2003]

Distinctively Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought?

1867

most important of which is "to reduce significantly the size of the
state."2 6
In the pursuit of that pragmatic agenda, Duncan points to the
housing-discrimination claim against Evelyn Smith, who refused to
rent one of the four apartments she owned (in a building which she did
not herself occupy) to an unmarried couple, citing her religious belief
that sex outside of marriage is sinful and that renting the apartment to
people who were likely to engage in such sex would implicate her in
their sin and thus be sinful itself. The California Supreme Court held
that her action violated the state's fair-housing laws, and that the
Constitution did not require that the state give her a religiously based
exemption from those laws. 27 The court argued that Smith's religious
belief was not substantially burdened because she operated the apart
ments as a purely commercial activity, and could invest her money in
an alternative that would not put her to a choice between complying
with the law and complying with her religious conscience. Duncan
construes this as a holding that "when people of faith choose to
engage in commercial activities in California they waive their right to
religious freedom. . . . The world has indeed turned upside down, and
good has become evil and evil good" (pp. 367-68 ) .
Marie A. Failinger and Patrick R. Keifert suggest a somewhat dif
ferent view of Smith's dilemma (and, perhaps, Duncan's as well). They
provide a Lutheran perspective on the civil law, in which "law is the
demand of God for preservation and re-creation of the world,
expressed through such orders of creation as the family and the state"
(p. 389 ) . But, Failinger and Keifert write,

No one can avoid the sins of the will: it is as likely (perhaps more likely)
that one individual claiming in conscience to be exempt from positive law
is driven by the sins of self-interest and self-delusion as it is that the ma
jority's decision is so flawed; it is as likely that an oppressed minority will
use power corruptly as will a self-satisfied majority. (p. 392)

26. P. 356. Although Duncan does not spell the point out, I take the thought here to be
that Christians can use the resources of Babylonian law in their effort to reduce the state's
size (because of his acknowledgement that the law of Babylon will reflect Babylonian val
ues).
27. P. 367. The case is Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 913 P.2d 909
(Cal. 1996). The court assumed that Smith might be taken to have presented a "hybrid"
claim under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), but did not directly so hold.
Instead, it said that the test applied to hybrid claims was the one embodied in the then-still
applicable Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court then found that application of the
antidiscrimination law did not place a substantial burden on Smith's religious exercise be
cause of the availability of alternative investment opportunities. Today, after City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the court's analysis would be cast directly as an analysis of a
hybrid claim (or the court might reject the claim on the ground that it was not really a hybrid
one). Litigation on a related question in the Ninth Circuit ended inconclusively. See Thomas
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
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The Christian's dilemma, that is, is not simply that t he Christian
may perceive a conflict between the state's demands and the demands
of conscience; it is equally that the Christian must wonder whether the
conflict she perceives is a result of the world's fallen-ness or her own. 28
This last dilemma suggests in turn why so few of the essays in this
book seem (to me, at least) to present a perspective on legal thought
that is at once distinctively Christian and organically connected to the
author's Christianity. The editors and some contributors hint at, or re
fer to, the marginalization of Christians in the contemporary United
States. Writing this Review in late December, and as a non-Christian,
I find this view puzzling when stated without qualification. The neces
sary qualification, I think, is that contemporary U. S. culture may per
haps marginalize Christians whose perspectives - on legal thought,
on culture, on literature, and so on down the list of possibilities - are
distinctively Christian rather than generically religious or, even more,
merely compatible with secular perspectives, and whose perspectives
derive organically from their holder's Christianity. In today's United
States, that is, there may not be enough potential authors with what I
would identify as truly Christian perspectives on legal thought to fill
out a collection of essays published with that title. 29

28. Oliver Cromwell's exhortation to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland,
"l beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken," available at
http://www.digiserve.co.uk/quotations/search.cgi?type=Author&terms=Oliver%20Cromwell
(website indexing Cromwell quotes) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003), seems relevant here.
29. I write this final sentence fully acknowledging that I am in no position to adjudicate
what is a "truly" Christian perspective. I certainly do not mean to suggest that the essays'
authors are not "true" Christians in any sense. My point is that I read the essays hoping to
find perspectives that derived in some strongly presented way from the authors' under
standing of Jesus's distinctive position in religious thought, and found relatively few of them.
That is why I have included the modifying phrase "what I would identify as" in the sentence
in the text.

